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In the days of sailing ships and solid shot, the business problems of
our country's defense were relatively simple, and little was heard about them.
This was due, for the most part, to the fact that the ships' guns and other
hardware were uncomplicated and military procurement was fairly simple;
however, as military weapons have developed into the fantastically complicated
and sophisticated systems of "today, and as our troops and ships have been more
and more disposed throughout the free world, the problems of business
administration and of procurement have increased tremendously in size and
complexity.
In earlier times the Department of Defense was willing in many cases
to sacrifice quality for quantity in the manufacture of weapons. That day is
disappearing. The weapons of today and of the future place emphasis on
improved reliability, which stresses quality . This is one reason for the
tremendous increase in the price of individual weapons. Polaris submarines
cost $100 million, compared to the $5 million submarines of World War II;
F-106 fighter aircraft cost more than $3 million, compared to $80 thousand for
World War II types; B-58 bombers cost $15 million each, against $250 thousand
for the B-17; and Atlas missile sites must be installed and equipped at a cost

2of scores of millions of dollars per squadron.
The effectiveness of these weapons, of course, is tremendously greater
than that of their World War II or Korean counterparts, so fewer of them are
needed. This is one reason why it has been possible to keep the military
budget within feasible limits.
In spite of this, the Department of Defense estimates its expenditures
in fiscal year 1962 will be almost $43 billion, of which $26 billion will be
spent on contracts for equipment, material, and services, including research
and development. These 26 billion dollars are more than three times the
combined purchasing volume of General Electric, General Motors, and United
States Steel. Approximately 7 million procurement transactions will take
place, most of which will be for small purchases under $2500, but this figure
gives one an idea of the procurement activity involved.
When procurement becomes this large a business mistakes and waste are
bound to occur. With the General Accounting Office and Congress riding herd
on the taxpayer's dollar and making no secret of the errors and waste in
procurement which they have uncovered, and with the newspapers eager to print
any readable news on the subject, the military procurement system has received
severe and frequent criticism.
As an example, Senator Paul Douglas (Democrat - 111.) and
Representative Thomas B. Curtis (Republican - Mo.), members of the Joint
Military Procurement Subcommittee, recently stated that the high-ranking
*-U. S., Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply
& Logistics) , Big Business in the Military
,
information pamphlet on defense
supply management.

officers of the armed services were more interested in preserving
bureaucracy than in economical buying, and that the military procurement
2
system was fraught with poor organization and mismanagement.
This is a typical criticism of the armed forces procurement system
and implies that personnel involved therein are, for the most part, either
lazy or incompetent or both. Of course, this is not true, but as a result of
such simplified reasoning, too many people have in their minds a vision of
military supply as expressed in terms of waste, duplication, inefficiency,
too many canned hamburgers, high priced oyster forks, and other vivid examples,
Defense procurement is cited in the press and radio on most of its mistakes
but usually never receives recognition for the good work accomplished by
thousands of competent, dedicated military and civilian supply specialists.
The American taxpayer is conscious of the high cost of military
procurement and, most certainly all of us want the Defense Department to get
every last penny's worth of every procurement dollar spent; consequently,
when waste and expensive mistakes are uncovered in military procurement it
hits a sensitive spot in all of us -- our pocketbooks. It is true that
military procurement has become very, very costly and that, unfortunately,
some expensive procurement mistakes are made; but to chalk this up mainly to
poor organization, mismanagement, and to a bunch of bureaucrats --as Senator
Douglas and Representative Curtis seem to have implied -- is a gross
simplification and an inadequate, incorrect explanation of the problem.
Washington Post , October 14, 1960, p. 1.

4For one thing, military procurement has been unnecessarily complicated
by a number of legal restrictions imposed by Congress upon the placement of
contracts. Instead of being able to concentrate solely on getting the best
bargain for the government's dollar, contracting officers find themselves
mired in regulations designed to enforce social, economic, and political
objectives through the use of procurement dollars. Such encumberments only
increase the chances of making costly errors while the benefits derived from
them are questionable. Relief from such legislation would most certainly
result in a more efficient and economical procurement operation.
In addition the armed services are being criticized constantly by
Congress for using negotiated contracts more than advertising. For example:
There have been many glaring examples of excessive spending
attributable directly to the system of negotiated contracts. In
effect, this amounts to sheer waste and is a procedure which
literally cries for remedial legislation.
3
Under the existing law there is much emphasis placed and the
Defense Department relies largely on what they describe as the
/negotiated/ incentive contracts. But in my opinion this has not
worked.
I think that there is only one answer for it, and that is a
clear definition in the law that it is the intention of Congress
that the Defense Department use in every instance competitive
bidding practices in buying.
^
^Styles Bridges, senator from New Hampshire, testimony before the
Military Procurement Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United
States Senate, U. S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on S. 500
,
Procurement Procedures of the Armed Services; S. 1383, Specific Standards
Governing the Use of Negotiated Contracts; and, S. 1875
?
Encouraging
Competition in the Procurement of the Armed Services , 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1959, p. 57.
John J. Williams, senator from Delaware, ibid.
, p. 55.

5As a result of such sentiments as these, considerable administrative burdens
are placed upon the contracting agency to justify negotiated contracts,
maintain records on them, and forward certain reports about them to Congress.
Many times nondelegable action by the military department secretary or
assistant secretary is specifically required.
It cannot be denied that much of the waste in procurement is due to
errors of judgment on the part of contracting personnel, but it is the
contention of the writer that the majority of these errors can be laid not to
stupidity and/or to incompetency, but rather, to the complexity of the
procurement process, and that the efficiency of procurement can be improved
through removal of some of the unnecessary burdens cited above.
It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze some of the more
outstanding encumberments now perched upon the shoulders of military
procurement and also, to point out the very real economies in procurement




THE BURDEN OF SOCIAL-ECONOMIC LEGISLATION5
Why Social-Economic Legislation Has Grown
The federal government is imposing its policies upon private industry
in an ever-increasing variety of ways, e.g., the granting or denial of
licenses and/or privileges, the levying of taxes and grants-in-aid for the
states. One of its principal methods -- and one which has a significant
effect on military procurement -• is the use of clauses in government contracts
by which the contractees must conform to standards or values which have no
direct bearing on procurement itself but which DO accomplish some of the
regulatory ends of government. This may be very edifying to people in the top
levels of the Executive and Legislative Departments, and satisfying and
rewarding to certain elements of the populace who benefit therefrom, but at
the procurement level such restrictions only complicate and make more
expensive an already difficult and costly process.
These inroads into the area of pure governmental procurement are only
natural in an era of rapid expansion of federal activities; however, such
5The main reference source for this chapter is an article by Arthur
S. Miller, "Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry,"
Virginia Law Review , January, 1955, pp. 27-58.

expansion requires new policies, more stretching of the powers implied in the
Constitution, and considerable ingenuity in perfecting different techniques by
which the new policies can be made effective. Contract manipulation is one
of these techniques.
Regulation by contract has been used by the federal government, in one
form or another, since the mid-nineteenth century. Its effect was minor
until about twenty years ago because federal purchases formed only a small
portion of the national economy. In 1940, however, the federal government
leaped from a small consumer to an extremely large one and has remained so
ever since, to the point that if it were suddenly reduced to its size and
activity of 1939, the national economy would be in a state of near-paralysis.
It follows that in such a commanding position any regulatory or
restrictive clauses which the federal government places in its procurement
contracts will have a noticeable effect throughout the country. Such clauses
can favor one segment of society over others, enforce minimum wages or
standards not otherwise provided by law, prohibit certain activities etc;
hence, this technique of enforcing government policies has become one of the
most used and most important methods of imposing the government's will on
industry.
The Change in Contract Relationships
The principal method used by American society to allocate natural and
human resources in the national community has long been the contract.
Traditionally, under the American free-enterprise system, the signing of a

8contract has assumed, among other things, two approximately equal bargainers
dealing at arm's length, each attempting to improve his position, with
neither having a superior bargaining position over the other.
Times are changing, however, and Increasingly greater portions of the
national resources and national economic life are being controlled by means
of contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power, in which one party
is able to force acceptance of his terms upon the other party. As a result,
the transaction is not based on the traditional concept of a contract but,
rather, upon power . To be sure, the outward form of the transaction is that
of a contract, but free bargaining is absent, having been replaced by a
process of private legislation. Theoretically, free bargaining still exists,
in that the other party is free either to enter or not enter into the
transaction, but in reality there is no choice (e.g., telephone service,
insurance agreements, conditional sales contracts). The weaker party needs
the goods or services and cannot go to other sources or, if he can, finds
that they do business in substantially the same manner.
The businessman seeking government contracts falls within this
category. As government procurement increases he finds himself more and more
dependent on government business, either as a primary contractor or as a sub-
contractor to a primary government contractor. Under these circumstances he
must submit to conditions having no relation to the buying and selling
function. Since 1940, when the federal government became the largest consumer
of private enterprise, this condition has become steadily more common, and
will continue to do so until the outcome of the struggle between the United
.
States and the U. S. S. R. is finally determined.
An astute observer of this phenomena has remarked:
Government purchasing has an important effect on the economy,
an effect which will certainly not diminish significantly in the
future. Government contracts as an institution play now, and will
continue to play, an increasingly important role in the allocation
of resources. On a continuing basis, a significant portion of the
annual gross national product will be allocated to the Federal
Government, particularly to the military forces. The role will not
be limited to allocation of resources; important social and economic
policy will continue to be promoted through manipulation of federal
contracts. . . .
Policies furthered through contract manipulation vary from
enforcing minimum wage standards to precluding purchases from
foreign sources of supply to aiding geographical areas having
conditions of unemployment. Each policy finds a variation on the
basic technique; each uses the federal contract in a different
manner. Basically, however, there is a thread of consistency which
ties them together: that ,of using the institution of contract as a
means for social control.
6
The observer, however, has failed to mention that the use of contracts
for social control not only affects the businessman, it also affects the
efficiency of federal procurement, particularly in the armed services. Let
us now look at the more important social control contract clauses and
consider their influence on procurement efficiency.
Areas of Government Control by Contract
The "Buy American" Act
The "Buy American Act" was originally passed as part of the Treasury
and Post Office Appropriation Act of 1934. It was enacted during a period of
6Arthur S. Miller, op. cit .. p. 32.
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economic depression but is still in force. Its primary purpose is to relieve
domestic unemployment by requiring government agencies to give preference to
domestic suppliers unless the domestic price is clearly unreasonable when
compared with the foreign bid. It also includes a preference over American
firms which import foreign-made goods, since the prohibition is on the
article, not the seller.
Until the beginning of 1955, the bid or offered price of a domestic
supplier was deemed unreasonable if it was greater than 125% of the bid or
offered price of the low foreign bidder. If it was less than 1257., the
domestic bid would be given preference. This had the effect of the
government 's paying a premium of up to 25% for such of its purchases in which
American business competed with foreign business.
Under President Eisenhower's "Trade Not Aid" policy, the Buy American
Act was modified by Executive Order 10582 of 2 December 1954, in order to
stimulate greater foreign trade in place of financial assistance. An
additional objective was to stretch the taxpayer's dollar through increased
competition for government contracts while still maintaining and protecting a
sound American economy. The modification consisted of lowering the bid or
offered price differential from 125% to 106%, or 112% in the event that the
low domestic bidder is from a labor surplus area, a small business concern,
or both. On the surface, the government pays a premium of up to 127. for those
of its purchases in which American business competes with foreign business;
however, in those instances where the low acceptable foreign bid or proposal
exceeds $100,000 and where the low acceptable domestic bid exceeds 106% -•
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or 112%, as the case may be -- the law requires that the proposed award not
automatically go to the low foreign bidder but that it be sent --in the case
of the Department of Defense -- to the secretary of the armed service
involved, for decision. Awarding of large contracts -- $100,000 or more --
to foreign bidders is given very careful consideration because of the
unpleasant repercussions which may develop domestically. Such awards are made
only when domestic bids are far out of line. In effect, then, foreign
competition for military procurement is limited to small business, to the
detriment of economic military procurement.
The Buy American policy has increased the costs of military
procurement, but to what degree is difficult, if not impossible, to determine.
The Commission on Foreign Economic Policy had this to say concerning the
subject:
Any estimate of the elimination of the Buy American provisions
on governmental costs ... is subject to only the roughest sort
of approximation. As nearly as we have been able to determine --
subject to extremely wide margins of error -- the United States
Government may be able to save up to $100 millions annually through
lower prices, and to increase customs revenue by $100 millions if
the Buy American principle were eliminated.'
With the federal budget running over $80 billion annually, one may
reflect that a saving of $200 million is a mere "drop in the bucket," but such
thinking is fallacious. Two hundred million dollars will buy two Polaris
submarines, each with the capability of launching 16 hydrogen-warhead missiles,
sufficient to severely impair the war-potential of even the mightiest foe.




This $200 million is 40% of what President Kennedy has requested to implement
the Act of Bogota. A "little" savings here and some more there and before one
realizes it, the amount saved can approach $2 billion -- almost 5 percent of
the Department of Defense budget. This particular $200 million, however,
cannot be saved because, by law, the Buy American clause is part of the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation and must be obeyed.
Aside from consideration of the welfare of the domestic industry,
there are factors unfavorable to large foreign purchases. One must ponder
the possibility of the unavailability of spare parts and technical assistance
as well as the possibility that excessive purchases overseas might seriously
curtail, or even force out of business or into other activities, comparable
segments of American industry. 'Proponents of the Buy American Act might
argue that this conceivably could result in the lack of adequate capacity
within the continental United States in case of global war, with disastrous
consequences. The government's present imbalance of payments plight would
also tend to discourage any change in the Buy American Act at the present
time.
On the other hand, it is a well-accepted economic principle that we
must engage in a large amount of foreign trade to continue to grow and
prosper. This means that U. S. goods must be priced competitively on the
world market. At the present time this is not the case except in those areas
where we possess a clear lead or manufacturing advantage; for example,
complicated industrial machinery, construction and mining equipment, and
grains and preparations therefrom.
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During the nation's infancy, the federal government sought to protect
and encourage domestic industry through use of the high import tariff. This
policy was ultimately dispensed with when it became clear that industrially
we could compete effectively with foreign nations without government
assistance. Another reason for the policy's being rescinded was the
realization that such a restriction on foreign competition was feathering the
nests of domestic businessmen at the expense of the American people as a
whole.
The Buy American Act is just another variation of the import tariff
principle. It may have been justified at the time of its enactment because
of the Great Depression, but in these days of prosperity, at a time when our
foreign trade must be stimulated not only for its intrinsic benefits to our
continued growth but also because Communist-bloc countries will capture the
potential markets if we do not compete effectively with them, the Buy American
Act is unjustified. Competition is the life-blood of industry but the Buy
American Act chokes it off.
Special Consideration for Labor Surplus Areas
On an equal footing with the Buy American legislation is the policy of
aiding labor surplus areas, i.e., area6 where high unemployment exists, by
placing contracts with labor surplus area concerns. This policy was
Instituted by Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 -- hereinafter referred to as
DMP-4 -- issued in 1952 by the Office of Defense Mobilization, which had as
its purpose "procurement by negotiated contracts and purchases with
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responsible concerns which are in an area of current or imminent labor
surplus ... in cases where the public interest dictates the need for doing
so."8
As a matter of national policy this nation is committed to "maximum"
employment and must, therefore, use all possible means to attain that goal.
The federal government must strive to create and maintain conditions leading
to a high level of employment, and providing work for people has been one of
its goals since the economic depression of the 1930' s.
Under the policy of DMP-4 areas of relatively high unemployment are
given preference in the award of federal contracts. It is a form of
"pump -priming" designed to assure utilization of the nation's total manpower
potential by making use of the manpower resources of each geographical area.
Digressing for a moment to the subject of "pump-priming," many economic
experts believe that large federal expenditures during the 1930 's contributed
most to the rise of the economy into conditions of relative prosperity and
consequent minimal unemployment. This "pump-priming" theory is apparently
subscribed to by the present administration if President Kennedy's recent
order to increase government expenditures -- through stepped-up highway
construction, for example -- is any criteria. Such measures may be good for
the overall economy but they can raise hob with frugal military procurement.
The following illustration shows how:
°U. S., Office of Defense Mobilization, undated mimeographed release
number ODM-3560
, p. 1.
Note that DMP-4 is a policy originated by the Executive Branch of the
government rather than being an enactment of Congress.
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Defense Secretary Wilson wants to know why military procurement
during the past fiscal year has lagged. Top officers of the Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps are on the carpet attempting to explain why
they ordered $5.5 billion less than they were supposed to order.
On June 30, end of the 1953-54 fiscal year, the military had $14.5
billion in unobligated appropriations. On the basis of estimated
need made in January, slightly less than $9 billion was expected to
remain in the till at fiscal year's end. The military will probably
have more trouble explaining the procurement lag than the Democrats.
Democratic leaders detect a political plot. Throwing $5.5 billion
in new orders into business channels along about late August or
early September could give quite a boost to the nation's economy.
It could absorb a good percentage of the 4,000,000 unemployed.
9
In this case it appears that military procurement officers were
chastised by their leader for attempting to save money -- $5.5 billion, to be
exact -- and very likely were condemned by the press as wasteful and
extravagant for spending it as ordered by their civilian superior.
Returning to DMP-4, as originally enacted it provided that certain
areas were to be designated as "surplus labor areas" by the Department of
Labor, and "all practicable steps consistent with procurement and military
objectives, other than price" were to be taken "to locate procurement" by the
Department of Defense and General Services Administration in the areas so
designated. The two agencies were authorized to pay a price differential,
i.e., higher prices, for the goods so procured. This authority, however, was
not used because of an unfavorable decision by the Comptroller General.
*The Lawyer's Weekly Report , July 5, 1954, para. 2.
10U. S., 18 Federal Register , 6995, 6995 (1953).
11U. S., 28 Decisions of the Comptroller General , 662 (1949).
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In November, 1954, EMP-4 was modified to the extent that authority
for the payment of price differentials was eliminated and the process of
"bid matching 11 abolished. ^ In place of this practice, a system of
"set-asides" has been substituted, the method being to split individual
procurements, awarding part of the total purchase -- the non- set-aside
portion -- to the lowest bidder, wherever located. "Negotiations for award of
the set-aside portion" are then conducted "only with responsible labor surplus
area concerns" and small business concerns -- about which more will be said
later -- "who have submitted responsive bids or proposals on the non-set-aside
portion at a unit price within 120 percent of the highest award made on the
non-set-aside portion." The set-aside is awarded at "the highest unit price
awarded on the non-set-aside portion, adjusted to reflect transportation and
other cost factors which were considered in evaluating bids on the non- set-
aside portion." 1
'
One must read this last paragraph at least two or three times before
grasping its meaning; imagine how much more difficult it is for the contracting
officer who must administer it.
By adding concepts unrelated to the buying function, as such, the
executive branch of the federal government is actually giving preference to
certain areas of the country at the expense of others, and, as a side-effect,
has made military procurement more difficult and more expensive; nevertheless,
**Under this practice, a firm in a surplus labor area was allowed to
obtain contracts by matching the best offer received by the agency from a firm
located outside those areas.
nJ. S., Department of Defense, Armed Service Procurement Regulation
(1960 Edition)
,





on the surface, once it is recognized that the federal government has some
responsibility for maintaining high levels of employment throughout the nation,
then the policy would seem to be a reasonable technique to be used in
fulfilling that responsibility; on the other hand, the amount of good
accomplished under DMP-4, despite elaborate procedures and regulations, appears


















of (3) to (1)
(B) - Percent
of O) to (2)
Calendar year 1954 $13.4 billion $961 million $33 million (A) - 0.25%
(B) - 3.50%
Mar. 1952a-Jan. 1955 $63.0 billion $2.9 billion $99 million (A) - 0.16%
(B) - 3.50%
aBeginnlng of Defense Mobilization Policy No. 4.
Although the above information is rather old, the implications contained
therein are substantiated by the fact that in fiscal year 1960, the U. S. Navy
spent only $4.6 million in labor surplus set-aside procurement out of $7.9
billion expended on procurement—approximately six-one hundredths of one per
14U. S., Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Task Force Report on Military Procurement , June, 1955, p. 25.

18
cent. One may well wonder if the effort is worth the results.
The Small Business Act
"Small business" includes the great majority of American business
firms, but in terms of gross national product or of wealth controlled, small
business is just plain, ordinary small compared to big business;
nevertheless, it involves a large number of votes and thus receives much
attention and much helpful legislation from Congress. This legislation is
mostly concerned with giving preferential treatment to small firms when
federal contracts are awarded.
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government
should aid, counsel, assist, and protect insofar as is possible the
interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free
competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of total
purchases and contracts for supplies and services for the
Government be placed with small-business enterprises. 16
Statements reflecting this policy are found in the acts governing
purchases by the military departments and the General Services Administration;
however, although the buying agencies are given responsibility for carrying
out the policy, they are not given specific instruction on how to do it.
Consequently, the Small Business Administration, hereinafter referred to as
the SBA, has been established to aid the agencies and to watch out for the
U. S., Department of the Navy, Survey of Procurement Statistics
(NAVEXOS P-1573) , June, 1960, p. 27.
16U. S., 67 Federal Statutes 232 (1953), United States Code, para. 631,
(Supplement I, 1954) (Small Business Act).
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interests of the small businessmen. The SBA has blossomed into a fairly large
organization of 2,244 employees, with small business specialists being
appointed in each principal procurement office of the military departments.
To implement the above policy, procurements are often divided into
such reasonably small lots as to enable and encourage small business concerns
to make bids for them. Obviously, the total price paid under such
circumstances will likely be appreciably higher than if the procurement had
been made entirely from one large firm.
Other methods employed to implement the policy are through granting
as many prime contracts as possible to small business, and through
encouragement of maximum subcontracting to small business by large firms
holding defense contracts. In addition, any individual procurement or class
of procurements (or an appropriate part thereof) is set aside for the
exclusive participation of small business concerns when such action is
determined by the contracting officer and the SBA representative (when one is
available) "to be in the interest of maintaining or mobilizing the nation's
full productive capacity ... or in the interest of assuring that a fair
proportion of Government procurement is placed with small business
concerns." 18
The set-aside procedure is commonly employed for small construction
and maintenance jobs, where small businesses are the better suited to
accomplish the task, but it also is not infrequently employed in the
'As subcontractors, the small businessmen may become economically
dependent on the large enterprises, which would then control their destiny.
The opportunities for hard dealing and for driving unfair bargains are very
tempting.
18
U. S., Department of Defense, ASPR, para. 1-706.1.
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procurement of large orders of equipment which are manufactured by a
significant number of small business firms—uncomplicated hand tools, for
instance. In these cases, the procurement must be divided, once again, into
such reasonably small lots as to be handled by small businesses, thus
increasing the total procurement price.
How much extra money and effort does it cost? It is doubtful if
anyone can successfully estimate it, but certainly in the man-hours spent in
rendering extra consideration to small business in the military procurement
area alone, the cost is appreciable, and it is obviously a complicated process,
Labor Regulation by Government Contracts
The field of labor involves perhaps the most comprehensive pattern of
federal regulation by contract. Wages, hours, and working conditions of
employees of government contractors are all regulated through the government
contract.
It was not always thus, even though as far back as 1840, the United
States government was interested in improving the condition of those employed
by it, or employed by those selling goods and services to it. Early emphasis
was on maximum hours and it was not until the twentieth century that minimum
wage provisions appeared. At the present time, however, not only wages and
hours, but also such matters as discrimination because of race or color are
covered by various statutes and executive orders.
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The most important of the statutes Imposing conditions upon those
wishing to contract with the government are the Davis-Bacon^ an<J the
Walsh-Healey^O Acts.
The Davis-Bacon Act provides that certain contracts over $2,000
entered into by any federal department for the construction, alteration, or
repair (including painting or decorating) of public buildings or public works
shall contain a provision "to the effect that no laborer or mechanic employed
directly upon the site of the work contemplated by the contract shall receive
21
less than the prevailing wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor."
Penalties, including termination of the contract and withholding of funds due
under it, may be imposed for failure to pay the prescribed wage.
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, as it is properly called, was
enacted on June 30, 1936, and requires that all contracts entered into by any
federal department for the manufacture or furnishing of supplies in any amount
exceeding $10,000 will be with manufacturers or regular dealers and shall
"incorporate by reference the representations and stipulations required by
said Act pertaining to such matters as minimum wages, maximum hours, child
labor, convict labor, and safe and sanitary working conditions.
"
22 The act
lH, S., 40 United States Code, para. 276a-276z-5 (1952).
20U
U. S., 41 United States Code, para. 35-45 (1952).
21




vests in the Secretary of Labor the power to establish wages, hours, and
working conditions for employees engaged in labor on federal contracts, and
contracts subject to the act require the payment of overtime compensation at
the rate of one and one-half times the basic rate of pay. The scope of
coverage of the act can be comprehended by comparing the number of contracts
and dollars involved in fiscal year 1938—5,306 contracts for $302 million23—
with those for fiscal year 1952—65,475 contracts for $11 billion. 24
Firms which have violated either the Davis-Bacon Act or the Walsh-
Healey Act may be "blacklisted." Such determination may be made by the
Department of Labor pursuant to its investigating complaints of noncompliance
and such a penalty can be an extremely drastic one, thus ensuring general
adherence to the laws.
Both acts seek to establish and maintain labor standards considered
to be fair by the government, though local industries dealing in private
enterprise need not comply therewith. This social control is accomplished
by subordinating the normal policy of the government to buy its necessities
at the lowest price, and procurement prices increase in order that the general
welfare may be served.
One can scarcely argue with the lofty aim of Congress for the federal
government to set the example in the fair treatment of the ordinary working
man, but the methods of enforcing the Walsh-Healey and Davis-Bacon Acts throw
23U. S., Department of Labor, 26th Annual Report of the Secretary of
Labor (1938), p. 48.
24
U. S., Department of Labor, 40th Annual Report of the Secretary of
Labor (1952), p. 103.
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an unwarranted burden on military procurement personnel.
The Secretary of Labor is empowered under these statutes to issue
regulations binding on other agencies with respect to the manner in which
these acts will be enforced. Under his regulations, a contracting officer
administering a construction contract, for example, must get the payrolls of
the contractor AND subcontractors who are engaged in construction and examine
25
them to see if substandard wages are being paid. Such a task has nothing
to do with getting the construction job done; it actually hinders the
fundamental purchasing mission.
Competition with Business
A side effect of the government's desire to promote private enterprise
is the Executive policy of minimizing the competition of the government with
industry. This policy differs from the other social-economic legislation
discussed in that its principal result has been an increase in the cost of
procurement rather than in its complexity .
As the federal government has grown larger it has found itself with an
increasing number of irons in the industrial fires of the nation, the result
being that it has operated a surprisingly large number of enterprises whose
products or services are not peculiar to the needs of the government alone,
but which actually are in competition with private business. A good example






Is the one-time coffee roasting plant at the Naval Supply Depot, Oakland,
California. This plant received raw coffee beans, frequently directly from
ships bringing them from South America to the San Francisco Bay area. The
beans were then roasted, ground, and packaged in various containers for
distribution throughout both the Navy shore establishment and the ships of the
fleet. Such an operation was far more economical from the Navy's point of
view than procuring already-packaged coffee from commercial sources, but there
is no doubt that this money-saving activity deprived private American
enterprise of a sizeable amount of business.
An important aim of the federal government has long been the
preservation and strengthening of a free enterprise economy and it has sought
to avoid unnecessary participation, on its own part, in activities that could
as well or better be carried on by private enterprise. The interpretation of
this last phrase includes getting out of activities which the government can
do for less than private business when, by doing so, private business will be
appreciably stimulated.
In 1955, President Eisenhower directed the inauguration of au executive
branch program designed to carry out the general policy that the federal
government would not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a
service or product for its own use if such product or service could be
procured from private enterprise through ordinary channels.
The initial phase of the program was concerned with determining the
magnitude and extent of governmental activities providing goods and services
for the government's own use. A comprehensive inventory of activities of a
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commercial-industrial nature was prepared and issued by the Bureau of the
Budget in May, 1956, in a publication entitled, "An Inventory of Certain
Commercial-Industrial Activities of the Government."
The second phase of the program, which is still in process in the
Department of Defense, has been the evaluation of commercial- industrial type
installations by the heads of agencies to determine whether the activities
should be discontinued, curtailed, or continued. Evaluations have been in
three groups: first, government-operated manufacturing activities; second, the
activities classified as services; and finally, all remaining commercial-
industrial activities.
In making the inventory mentioned above, the Department of Defense
found approximately 5,000 commercial- industrial installations. As of the end
of 1960, about 2,900 installations had been evaluated, of which it was decided
to discontinue 450. The remaining 2,450 installations were continued for
compelling reasons--needed for national security, administratively unfeasible
to contract for commercially, etc.. Of those to be continued, over 150 are to
be curtailed.
Among the installations discontinued are automobile repair shops,
bread and bakery shops, horticultural services and specialties, ice cream
plants, and, of course, the previously-mentioned coffee roasting plant.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine how much the price of
military procurement has been increased--if at all-- by this policy. It may
well be argued that the direct increase of cost resulting, for instance, from
discontinuing a bread and bakery shop and obtaining such supplies from a
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commercial bakery is offset by the indirect decrease in cost resulting from
release of the bread and bake shop crew to other duties and from discontinuance
of the overhead costs of operating the bread and bake shop.
It is probably safe to say, however, that this policy has resulted in
an increase in the DIRECT costs of military procurement and a DECREASE in
operations and personnel expenses.

CHAPTER III
WHY NEGOTIATION IS NECESSARY
During fiscal year 1959 some 80 per cent of the military contract
dollars and 70% of the total contract transactions over $2,500 were accounted
for by negotiated contracts. ^ The figures were even higher in previous
years. Naturally, this has drawn strong criticism from Congress. The typical
attitude on the "hill" is embodied in the comment of a leading congressman,
"Why is it such a percent ./sit/ of Defense spending must be accomplished this
way /negotiated contracts/? My state government can buy all of its
27
requirements with sealed bids. Why can't the military do the same thing?" '
The press is of the same opinion, if one may judge from the following
illustration:
ANOTHER TRAGIC STORY OF WANTON WASTE
by Ed Koterba
This is the tragic story of AN-WRT2, another case history in
the Pentagon of fantasy of wanton waste of the taxpayer dollar.
AN-WRT-2 is the code number for a naval radio transmitter.
Millions of dollars are involved.
26
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This sad tale begins in 1953. The big chiefs of the Pentagon's
Navy wanted a transmitter which could be used for both surface and
submarine craft.
They selected one company to do the research for it. No bids
were taken. The contrajct was awarded to a firm without competition,
thru "negotiation" /sic/.
Tine firm, Westinghouse Corporation, was handed $1.8 million to
spend in developing this particular radio. In other words,
taxpayers paid for the research and development of the transmitter.
When the radio was ready for production (development cost
Westinghouse not one cent) , the Navy awarded a contract for
manufacturing the units.
Instead of seeking bids in the ordinary way, the Navy turned
thumbs down on outside competition. The contract went to Westing-
house. Our cost: $12.8 million. That came to $29,725 per radio.
Last year, the Navy wanted more of those radios. Again they
shunned outside bids altho /sic/ pressure from other companies was
hard against the doors.
This time, Westinghouse, the sole-source on a negotiated-
contract, got it for $12.1 million. This time the radios cost
$19,600 each.
Now, what would those" transmitters have cost the taxpayers if
bids were thrown open to other companies, in the manner of true
,
American red-blooded business competition?^"
It would seem that the Navy erred grievously in failing to procure the
AN-WRT-2 transmitters by the advertised bid method; however, let us analyze
at close range the problems with which one becomes involved when using this
method.
There are four criteria to permit advertising to be applicable or
effective in procurement. These are:
1. Adequate descriptions or specifications of what is to be purchased.
This suggests an item that is reasonably stable in design, and one which will
be essentially the same, including the minimal quality, no matter who produces
it. With regard to Mr. Koterba's comments above, when the Navy was seeking a
28Washington Daily News , February 21, 1961, p. 8.
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NEW type of radio transmitter, specifications could hardly be drawn up for
something that did not yet exist, and bids could not very well be taken without
specifications on which to make a bid.
2. There must be two or more suppliers available, willing and able
to compete effectively for the government's business.
3. Selection of the successful bidder can be made on the basis of
price alone.
4. Sufficient time must be available to prepare a complete statement
of the government's needs and the terms upon which it will do business, and
to carry out the administrative procedures required by the advertised bid
method.
This method is completely ineffective when any one of these essentials
cannot be satisfied. Someone once likened these criteria to a four- legged
stool. If any one leg is removed, the stool is useless.
A fifth criteria might also be added, viz., that the details of the
item may be publicized and not be restricted by security classifications or
by proprietary design. This very likely could not have been done in 1953 in
the case of the AN-WRT-2, which was needed in connection with the then highly
classified Polaris program.
Formerly the advertised bid method has been usable largely in peacetime
years where subsistence, supplies, and standardized weapons and equipment were
procured for a relatively small military establishment; also, if new items had
to be procured, these criteria applied when military laboratories could take
the time to perfect the concepts, complete the designs, and put the new item
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into the procurement mechanism. But let some urgency be involved and time
become critical and this slow-paced, routinized advertising procedure had to
be abandoned to reduce the time either to select and get a contractor underway
or to get the item complete enough--from a design specification standpoint--
to put into a producer's hands.
Advertising has been used to accomplish large amounts of procurement;
its suitability and successful utilization have been taken for granted. This
does not mean that it is free from fault and defect. The general public does
not hear very much about its weaknesses. This is what happens in actual
operation under advertising.
Whenever anything goes wrong, it is possible to blame the impersonal
system or the low bidder himself for the result, provided, of course, that all
involved have meticulously conformed to the mechanical rules and avoided
applying judgment and making decisions with which issue could be taken. The
unsuccessful higher bidders have only themselves to criticize for not bidding
more realistically; the late bidders--likewise, for their dilatory acts;
the nonresponsive bidders, for the same reason. Procurement personnel can
sympathize with those who were not the lowest; in rare cases, they may have
to weigh disqualifications of a low bidder, but even this unpleasant act can
be avoided except in the face of preponderant factual evidence, often not
easily established.
Poor contracts DO result from advertising. Prices have been too low
in cut-throat competitive situations, resulting in losses or low returns which
have discouraged continuation of good contractors seeking to supply the
government--where there is an alternative, of course; or have even resulted in
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bankruptcy, particularly in small business enterprises with limited financial
resources. The loss of suitable experienced contractors for these reasons
hurts the defense programs either because of failure to deliver on time or at
all; or because the economic pressure forces him to cut corners, perhaps
quality.
Where the low bidder is a concern whose capabilities are suspect
because of inadequate financing, technical ability, poor quality, incompetent
management, or any similar weakness, it is very difficult to firmly take a
position to disqualify it, lacking conclusive evidence or records. Even
inexperienced procurement personnel can often sense these dangers by
observation, interview, inspection, or research and lay it before higher
authority; but the penalties for exercising such discretion can be severe under
advertising. Most likely such a weak enterprise will be a small business
concern, with numerous types of friendly support available, based primarily on
the fine character and reputation of principal personalities involved.
One of the presently critical situations is the shortage of technical
manpower. Such personnel are vital to the preparation of bids. Under the
advertising system, an even larger number of bidders are permitted, or
encouraged, to prepare and submit bids; obviously a large amount of this
bid-preparation effort becomes wasted. In addition to wasting this currently
precious resource, the actual dollar cost of the unsuccessful bidding effort
by the large numbers of bidders must be recouped through expense factors on
the government business handled by them eventually. Thus, the advertising
system, perse, is prone to introduce an extra and uncontrollable cost.

32
Another hidden cost factor of much greater significance, but which is
extremely difficult to evaluate, would be attributable to the advertising
system if it were to be used more extensively, as many urge. This is due to
the fact that the military services are no longer able to assume responsibility
for complete engineering of as much equipment as they used to in pre-World
War II days. Too many new kinds of items, vast new technologies just being
created, and the need for stand-by manufacturing competence in industry for
massive requirements all have forced upon the nation a military-industry
partnership in technical competence, with military funding and direction, to
attain superior weaponry.
The alternative course for government would be to develop a duplicate
technological competence, competitively with industry, for exclusively
military purposes--assuming that this was even possible in the present
scientific and technical manpower shortage. If this duplicate engineering
competence could be established--at great cost, and with damage to the overall
economy— then the military could prepare the adequate, complete, and
realistic specifications necessary to make sound advertising bids possible.
Such an engineering force within the military establishment could explore the
military problem; establish the environmental requirements; carry on the
research and development work leading to successful prototypes; and then,
following service-testing, attempt to prepare manufacturing designs that could
be followed by industry to turn out an appropriate volume by best methods and
at lowest cost. Fortunately, one cannot even consider this fantasy; the cost to
support it would be gigantic, and its detrimental effect on our national
development would be unacceptable. Instead, the military performs only the
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Initial phases of defining the problem, and trying to set up preliminary goals
by means of performance specifications which recite military requirements and
characteristics; then they turn to industry and ask a number of firms with
advanced competence to contribute to the ultimate design on a competitive
basis whenever the time, funds, and available skills make this possible.
Advertising would preclude this partnership technique in most areas of
equipment. To force the use of advertising under these conditions--where
complete competence is outside the military -- would seriously affect our
military superiority. To even attempt it would require repeated cycles for
individual steps in a development, in securing possible technical contributions,
with a most probable inferiority, at a greater cost in time and money.
If advertising is the best form of procurement in practically all
cases, as so many people, including congressmen, seem to think, then it should
be widely used by the major purchasing activities of industry; but sucl i is not
the case.
In the first place, it is more expensive as a routine procedure due
to a more complete preparation of bid data and to the larger volume of bidders
to be supplied with such data. Also, the extra time intervals needed for
this kind of routine procedure are not felt justifiable, or, in some cases,
allowable.
Second, industry and commerce seem to have learned from management
research and study that the fuller utilization of the individual's competence
is important—even vital— to our national progress in the light of future
manpower deficiencies. Industry strives to attain this by job analysis,
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personnel training and development, increased responsibility, improved
organization, and management control techniques. The very spirit of the
advertising system, with its rigidity, is opposed to this concept, and would
be a retrogressive step.
Industry has adopted some limited applications of what approaches
advertising. A few institutions follow a mechanical bid procedure not unlike
the government, but without its full rigidity. Much construction work lends
itself to such a pattern; however, it seems clear that the adoption of the
advertising-for-bid method to secure the benefits of competition has not been
extensive and that other techniques, generally identified as negotiation,
have served to secure the desired results of, first, assured delivery; second,
essential quality; and then, when overall reliable performance is assured,
insuring that the price is low but fair, in comparison with other equally
competent sources. The lesson seems to be to hold on to a good supplier once
you have found him.
Yet, because of the prevailing and persistent idea in Congress that
the advertised bid is the best method of procurement, the Armed Service
Procurement Act of 1947, which is the legal foundation of military buying,
indicates strong preference for contracting by advertising and places
considerable administrative burdens upon the contracting agency to justify
negotiated contracts.
The legal downgrading of negotiation as a tool of contracting is
contrary to the fact that both advertising and negotiation are necessary and
desirable in the normal course of military buying.

35
It should be realized that, to a great extent, the nature of the item
to be purchased determines whether advertising or negotiation is appropriate;
for example, negotiation is generally a more efficient tool of purchasing than
advertising in contracting for aircraft, ships, tanks, electronic gear,
missiles, and proprietary items. When special arrangements are needed, as in
long lead-time contracts, purchases MUST be by negotiation. On the other hand,
when standard commercial type items or items with clear-cut specifications are
being procured, advertising may be the preferable method of buying.
In negotiated purchasing, fair and reasonable prices to the military
departments are insured through skillful negotiation, sound cost analysis,
and repricing techniques; they are further insured when competition is present.
When negotiations are under competitive conditions, the departments have a
special advantage in the pricing process in that two or more rounds of
negotiation with the knowledge of all competitors' prices are possible. Even
though the Armed Services Procurement Act refers to competition almost
exclusively in connection with purchases by advertising, competition can also
play a very important role in negotiated contracting. Broad industry
participation in military purchases can be accomplished through negotiation
as well as advertising.
Invitations to submit proposals can be distributed widely; an aggressive




During the past eleven years the Department of Defense has embarked
upon a coordinated procurement program in order to eliminate duplication and
overlapping of procurement operations between and among the military
departments and to improve the effectiveness and economy of military supply
and service operations. These objectives are achieved through centralization
and consolidation of procurement functions common to two or more military
departments in order to secure the benefits of large volume purchasing and
are in the form of three programs: (1) single department procurement;
(2) plant cognizance procurement; and (3) single manager procurement. The
following hypothetical problems will illustrate how these programs save the
taxpayers many procurement dollars.
Case 41
Let us say that the Bureau of Yards and Docks Supply Office, which is
in charge of procuring all ordinary rolling stock and construction equipment
for the U. S. Navy, including spare parts, decides, from the data furnished
by its electronic data processing installation, that it will require 10,500
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6-volt, dry-cell automobile batteries for use in the Navy's rolling stock
during fiscal year 1962.
Considering the means available for procuring so large a volume of a
common item, one would naturally conclude that the most economical method
would be to issue specifications and solicit bids. Such is not the case,
however, as far as the Navy is concerned, because of the Department of
Defense's single department procurement program .
Under this program one military department, utilizing its regularly
established purchasing system, purchases the requirements for certain
commonly used commodities for all the military departments. The thirty-two
commodities assigned to this type of procurement include such items as paint,
lumber, coal, photographic equipment, drums and cans, hand tools, solid fuels,
and dry-cell batteries. The Army has been assigned responsibility for
procurement of the latter, so the Bureau of Yards and Docks Supply Office
would not attempt to purchase its 10,500 dry-cell batteries direct from
industry but would forward the order to the U. S. Army, where it would be
combined with similar requirements of the other armed services and procured,
very likely, in one large order for a unit price appreciably lower than that
which any one of the services, acting independently, could have obtained.
Case #2
Assuming that the Bureau of Naval Weapons desires to procure two
hundred rotor blades as replacement parts for Sikorski helicopters in use
throughout the naval air force, one would imagine that the way to accomplish
this would be to negotiate directly with the Sikorsky Aircraft Division of
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United Aircraft Corporation for a fair price. Instead, the order is placed
with the U. S. Air Force. Why? Because procurement of this particular item
falls within the Department of Defense's plant cognizance procurement program
,
under which responsibility for all procurement of aircraft engines, propellers,
and airframes from certain commercial aviation plants has been assigned to
either the Air Force or the Navy.
In this particular case, the Air Force has been assigned cognizance
over the plant that produces the propellers for the Navy's helicopters.
Unlike the single department procurement program, the plant cognizance
procurement program does not save money directly through mass purchasing;
rather, it permits proper service allocation of sometimes- limited production
capacity available. Further, it avoids duplication of military inspection
procedures and personnel in a particular plant, and provides a single point
of contact and source of information within the plant for contractors.
This and the other consolidated procurement programs have reduced the
number of inspectors from 18,000 to 13,000.
Case #3
The U. S. Army, in predicting its permanent change of station
movements for fiscal year 1962, arrives at the following estimates, among
others:
1. Personnel traveling to and from overseas stations via ship
a) 2,840 officers
b) 7,453 officers' dependents
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c) 5,832 enlisted personnel
d) 16,712 enlisted personnel's dependents
e) 44,760 troops
2. Personnel traveling to and from overseas stations via aircraft
a) 6,405 officers
b) 3,669 officers' dependents
c) 47,718 enlisted personnel
d) 12,845 enlisted personnel's dependents
Now the Army doesn't start arranging commercial ship transportation
and signing contracts with aircraft passenger lines to handle the large
volume of transportation required for such personnel movements. Instead, it
gives its ship movement requirements to the Military Sea Transportation Service
of the U. S. Navy, and its air movement requirements to the Military Air
Transportation Service of the U. S. Air Force. 9 These services are operated
under the Department of Defense's single manager procurement program .
In this program, centralized procurement activities, assigned for
management to the secretary of a single military department, procure the
combined net requirements for selected, commonly-used commercial type
commodities and services for all military departments. Some of the commodities
and services included, besides ocean and air transportation, are subsistence,
petroleum and petroleum products, clothing and textiles, and medical material.
Like the single department procurement program, the single manager procurement
program saves taxpayers dollars by coordinating the requirements of ALL the
military services and procuring them on a massive basis.
2
'In far greater detail, of course, than the above estimates.
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There is another centralized procurement program which should be
mentioned, but this one is government-vide in scope, rather than being
confined solely to the Department of Defense. This is the interdepartmental
procurement program, operated by the General Services Administration. Under
this program, the General Services Administration procures certain commonly
used, commercial- type items for all government agencies, including the
Department of Defense. Examples are household and office furniture,
typewriters, floor coverings, spark plugs, and vacuum cleaners. Economy is





Military procurement in the United States is so large, diverse, and
complex that it dwarfs full comprehension. Much publicity has been given to
the waste and expensive "goofs" which have been uncovered in the developing
and purchasing of defense hardware but little information is circulated by
the press and Congress concerning the efforts of the armed services to make
procurement more economical.
It is doubtful if one out of one hundred Americans ever heard of the
coordinated military procurement programs just discussed, or realizes the
considerable economies in money and manpower which they have effected.
When a contracting officer errs in the type of contract he employs
for the purchase of an expensive type of electronic equipment, the chances
are very good that the story will make the newspapers. When the same
contracting officer saves the Defense Department considerable money through
use of the right contract and through judicious repricing, the good news never
gets outside professional circles.
It is this type of one-sided reporting that leaves the American public
with the general impression that military procurement is fraught with waste,





The truth of the matter is that the majority of contracting officers
are intelligent, hard-working, well- trained, and career-motivated personnel
who are interested in doing the best job possible, if for no other reason
than that their promotion depends upon it. There is also tremendous pressure
throughout the military organization to get the most for the money spent.
This is because Department of Defense estimates of what it really needs are
annually $10 to $13 billion greater than the amount appropriated by Congress,
which naturally generates acute cost-consciousness in the higher echelons.
Expensive procurement mistakes are made because the people doing the
procuring are only human and can remember so much and no more. The procurement
process is unnecessarily complicated by social-economic legislation of
doubtful value and by the insistence of Congress that negotiated contracts
be justified out of all proportion. Removal of these time-consuming,
confusing, and complicated encumberments will simplify the procurement process
appreciably, permit contracting and other procurement personnel to concentrate
on their primary jobs, and will result in more economical and faster
purchasing of the necessary supplies and equipment.
The armed services should have a maximum latitude of judgment in
developing suppliers of military products in much the same manner as industry
develops its suppliers. This is of particular importance because of the
dependence of military strength upon sound relationships between industry and
the departments. Human judgment should not be discounted in favor of the
mechanical procedures of advertising.
.
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Negotiation should be recognized in law for what it is, viz., a
perfectly normal, sound buying method which the departments find necessary to
place heavy reliance upon. They should not have to justify it every time they
use it.
With regard to social-economic legislation, a strong case exists
against maintaining social control through contracts. It is the mission of
the contracting agency and the procurement officer to obtain what is needed,
in both quantity and quality, at the time when it is needed, at a decent
price, and under circumstances which are fair to both the government and the
contractor. The government has no particular desire to drive a hard bargain;
neither is it in the business, of making contractors rich through excessive
profits. A basic idea of federal procurement is to give the contractor a
decent, reasonable profit.
The procurement process, at best, is a complex, often tediously
detailed operation; for example, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(1960 Edition) numbers 904 pages, with a new change of 25 to 70 pages
forthcoming every two to three months. This is supplemented by the Navy
Procurement Directives (611 pages) plus voluminous Navy Department
Instructions, all on the subject of how to procure, what to do, and what NOT
to do. It is extremely difficult to keep abreast of all of this printed
information.
Military procurement is an operation of such magnitude that it cannot
be compared to operations in the business world. It encompasses far more than
the award of contracts. The latter is just a part of the entire procurement
•.
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process. Once awarded, the contract must be administered -• payments and
inspections must be made, deliveries must be accepted, and change orders
issued; occasionally contracts must be terminated, and often prices are
redetermined. Under some contracts an audit must be made of the contractor's
books, and subcontracts must be approved. These are but a few of the many
aspects of contract administration, which is the part of the procurement
process designed to assume performance of the contract. Even before awarding
a contract a complex procedure must be followed for the determination of
requirements, the drafting of specifications, and the budgeting of funds.
As complex as it would be without adornment, the process is made even
more tedious and confusing by added requirements which have nothing to do
with the articles being bought. At the very least, these requirements burden
personnel engaged in buying with considerations which are often mutually
contradictory and which tend to obscure the goal sought. How can the purchaser
favor, for example, both small business and surplus labor areas? When should
a large procurement be broken into smaller orders to give small businesses
a chance to compete--at a probable increase in procurement price? As a result
of these nonbuying requirements delays in procurement are bound to occur,
to some extent. The elaborate administrative machinery set up to administer
the policies of aid to small business is a good example.
The requirements are also burdensome to the draftsmen of the contracts,
who must engage in combat with some clauses which are either meaningless or
so ambiguous as to be unintelligible, resulting in pages of so-called
"boilerplate" attached to contracts. The fine print of these clauses is often
•
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not enforced, because the military services do not have enough personnel to
enforce each of the contract warranties.
In some cases the clauses place the responsibility of insuring
compliance with their terms on government personnel not trained to enforce
statutes, and whose job i6 entirely unrelated to law enforcement.
The social clauses in government contracts serve no useful purpose
whatever from the point of view of the buying agency itself. On the contrary,
they create problems and add burdens to an already exceptionally complex
process.
Are the ends attained through contract manipulation worth the price
of confusion and delay? It is reasonable and logical to maintain that the
federal government, and especially the Department of Defense, adopt a
hardheaded, business-like approach to its contracting. Certainly there is a
strong national interest in minimizing the cost of government procurement, as
to both the cost of goods and services obtained and the cost of personnel
engaged in that activity; and there is an equally strong national interest in
obtaining military goods as soon as possible. On the other hand, there is
also strong interest in a vigorous American economy, the survival of small
business, and better wages and working conditions; nevertheless, to the extent
that errors are made, costs go up, and delays occur, the regulatory ends
appear unjustified and, most especially, the Buy American Act, DMP-4, and the
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